The whole debate is as ridiculous as it is academic, a lot of fancy talk about string theory that is entirely beside the point.
The point of materialism is that matter exists independently of the mind. The real world can be made out of mathematics, that would only change what matter is.
Okay, “metaphysical materialism” would be incoherent, whatever that is, but materialism is not a theory of metaphysics. It’s also not just a theory of history. It’s a method of approaching the study of the world, particularly the social world, an understanding that our models are only at best a one sided representation of a cross section of the world. Whether the ultimate laws of nature are perfectly represented with a few equations is irrelevant. When it comes to modeling anything complex, like the human world, an abstract model is never enough. Hence, we can’t base ourselves on the development of abstract categories, but of real life.
De Villarreal thinks it’s very profound to say materialism is ideology. The important point is that ideology is material, meaning it’s something formed in the minds of real people via social processes. Ideas don’t evolve according to their own logic because they only partially capture reality. The positivist method, in imitation of mathematics, starts from a definition (for instance, democracy is a social system with properties x, y, z) and then tries to derive properties on that basis. Materialism, in contrast, doesn’t start from ideas (‘the nation state’ or ‘democracy’ or what have you). Rather, we ask how those categories arise, change, and disappear in historical society.
There is nothing wrong in Engels’ quote. It should be obvious that geometric abstractions would not have been arrived at without spatial reasoning derived from real experience. This fact obviously doesn’t imply that a mathematical object like a cylinder was arrived at by measuring cylinders. That’s a silly misreading of the quote, the main point of which is this: “But, as in every department of thought, at a certain stage of development the laws, which were abstracted from the real world, become divorced from the real world, and are set up against it as something independent, as laws coming from outside, to which the world has to conform.” You can create a model of a market, for instance, starting with some set of definitions, and then develop the theory affording to its own internal logic. Sometimes you get something useful, other times you build a bridge to nowhere. Your model might do a good job of representing a real process, but not capture the conditions under which that process arises or disappears. Markets can be thought of as an algorithm for allocating resources, but in the real world they arise out of the actions of real people, they have a social origin and a history, they are part of a larger process, hence they are much more than an algorithm.
You imply that Engels failed to understand Hegel, but Marx knew better, confining himself to a theory that human history is driven by the development of the productive forces. But this point that you cite from Anti Duhring is made again and again by both Engels and Marx. (See, for instance, The German Ideology) Imagine the arrogance to call Engels a crude thinker just because you know a little bit of math!
The point of materialism is that matter exists independently of the mind. The real world can be made out of mathematics, that would only change what matter is.
#+end_quote
As I kind of hinted at in the piece, mathematicism would be the next best position for a materialist to take after giving up on physicalism, but wouldn't be safe either because simpler mathematical structures generate more complex ones, so could not be foundational but would lead us right back to Hegel's question: "with what does science have to begin".
#+begin_quote
Okay, “metaphysical materialism” would be incoherent, whatever that is, but materialism is not a theory of metaphysics.
#+end_quote
Materialism, at least as understood by every philosopher but a Marxist, is a theory about the nature of the physical universe, and thus definitionally metaphysical.
#+begin_quote
Whether the ultimate laws of nature are perfectly represented with a few equations is irrelevant
#+end_quote
This is really an abdication of any foundational claims by materialism, basically just picking up from whatever is around and going from there. I'm actually more sympathetic to that, except it's not what Villareal was doing. Also, Maxism is kind-of, well, a theory. I count it as a truism that any sufficiently complex system cannot be modeled both predicively and precisely, in other words that either the model cannot actually predict what will happen or it will contain simplifications. We can't even precisely model the gravitational interaction of three bodies! So if that is all materialism has to say it might be correct but I'm not particularly impressed, and it also doesn't relieve us of the burden of making the best possible theories. What was it Villareal wrote about the need for every revolutionary to also be a philosopher. He might have been wrong about that, but your wielding of academicism as an insult kind-of proves my point on the disdain for abstraction inherent in Marxism. This was never meant to be an everyday-peoples-debate. I'm not and you are not. Everyday people don't hang out on Substack complaining about someone's position on materialism on a Sunday afternoon.
#+begin_quote
Rather, we ask how those categories arise, change, and disappear in historical society.
#+end_quote
That's not materialism, that's standard dialectics.
#+begin_quote
That’s a silly misreading of the quote, the main point of which is this: “But, as in every department of thought, at a certain stage of development the laws, which were abstracted from the real world, become divorced from the real world, and are set up against it as something independent, as laws coming from outside, to which the world has to conform.”
#+end_quote
Again, my main objection against that quote was that it was creating an opposition between "real" things and mathematical entities, which, if mathematicism is true, is wrong.
#+begin_quote
You imply that Engels failed to understand Hegel, but Marx knew better,
#+end_quote
I did no such thing! In fact, at the beginning of the piece I said that Marx made a grievous error in throwing out the best parts of Hegel, though he did at least give us a good theory of social reproduction.
#+begin_quote
Imagine the arrogance to call Engels a crude thinker just because you know a little bit of math!
I didn't say he was wrong, I said he misses the point by focusing on slight imperfections and simplifications. He might be completely right in Marx assuming that money has no cost for instance, but removing that simplifying assumption does not change the derivation of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, which is what really matters. Moreover, even if it was found that a simplification was made by Marx whose removal would invalidate his derivation of TRPF, it would then have to be shown that this was not just a slight error in the proof that could be corrected for easily, which, I think, couldn't be done because I think it's not particularly hard to derive TRPF because it's a fairly elementary consequence of the way we derive value. In fact, I think Marx's derivation might have been overly complicated, which isn't to say anything against him, scientists often derive new results from an overly elaborate set of assumptions that can be trimmed down later, and Marx was trying to fortify his position against as many objections as he could. I don't feel familiar enough with Drumm's work for an in-depth treatment though.
The whole debate is as ridiculous as it is academic, a lot of fancy talk about string theory that is entirely beside the point.
The point of materialism is that matter exists independently of the mind. The real world can be made out of mathematics, that would only change what matter is.
Okay, “metaphysical materialism” would be incoherent, whatever that is, but materialism is not a theory of metaphysics. It’s also not just a theory of history. It’s a method of approaching the study of the world, particularly the social world, an understanding that our models are only at best a one sided representation of a cross section of the world. Whether the ultimate laws of nature are perfectly represented with a few equations is irrelevant. When it comes to modeling anything complex, like the human world, an abstract model is never enough. Hence, we can’t base ourselves on the development of abstract categories, but of real life.
De Villarreal thinks it’s very profound to say materialism is ideology. The important point is that ideology is material, meaning it’s something formed in the minds of real people via social processes. Ideas don’t evolve according to their own logic because they only partially capture reality. The positivist method, in imitation of mathematics, starts from a definition (for instance, democracy is a social system with properties x, y, z) and then tries to derive properties on that basis. Materialism, in contrast, doesn’t start from ideas (‘the nation state’ or ‘democracy’ or what have you). Rather, we ask how those categories arise, change, and disappear in historical society.
There is nothing wrong in Engels’ quote. It should be obvious that geometric abstractions would not have been arrived at without spatial reasoning derived from real experience. This fact obviously doesn’t imply that a mathematical object like a cylinder was arrived at by measuring cylinders. That’s a silly misreading of the quote, the main point of which is this: “But, as in every department of thought, at a certain stage of development the laws, which were abstracted from the real world, become divorced from the real world, and are set up against it as something independent, as laws coming from outside, to which the world has to conform.” You can create a model of a market, for instance, starting with some set of definitions, and then develop the theory affording to its own internal logic. Sometimes you get something useful, other times you build a bridge to nowhere. Your model might do a good job of representing a real process, but not capture the conditions under which that process arises or disappears. Markets can be thought of as an algorithm for allocating resources, but in the real world they arise out of the actions of real people, they have a social origin and a history, they are part of a larger process, hence they are much more than an algorithm.
You imply that Engels failed to understand Hegel, but Marx knew better, confining himself to a theory that human history is driven by the development of the productive forces. But this point that you cite from Anti Duhring is made again and again by both Engels and Marx. (See, for instance, The German Ideology) Imagine the arrogance to call Engels a crude thinker just because you know a little bit of math!
- Peter Ross
#+begin_quote
The point of materialism is that matter exists independently of the mind. The real world can be made out of mathematics, that would only change what matter is.
#+end_quote
As I kind of hinted at in the piece, mathematicism would be the next best position for a materialist to take after giving up on physicalism, but wouldn't be safe either because simpler mathematical structures generate more complex ones, so could not be foundational but would lead us right back to Hegel's question: "with what does science have to begin".
#+begin_quote
Okay, “metaphysical materialism” would be incoherent, whatever that is, but materialism is not a theory of metaphysics.
#+end_quote
Materialism, at least as understood by every philosopher but a Marxist, is a theory about the nature of the physical universe, and thus definitionally metaphysical.
#+begin_quote
Whether the ultimate laws of nature are perfectly represented with a few equations is irrelevant
#+end_quote
This is really an abdication of any foundational claims by materialism, basically just picking up from whatever is around and going from there. I'm actually more sympathetic to that, except it's not what Villareal was doing. Also, Maxism is kind-of, well, a theory. I count it as a truism that any sufficiently complex system cannot be modeled both predicively and precisely, in other words that either the model cannot actually predict what will happen or it will contain simplifications. We can't even precisely model the gravitational interaction of three bodies! So if that is all materialism has to say it might be correct but I'm not particularly impressed, and it also doesn't relieve us of the burden of making the best possible theories. What was it Villareal wrote about the need for every revolutionary to also be a philosopher. He might have been wrong about that, but your wielding of academicism as an insult kind-of proves my point on the disdain for abstraction inherent in Marxism. This was never meant to be an everyday-peoples-debate. I'm not and you are not. Everyday people don't hang out on Substack complaining about someone's position on materialism on a Sunday afternoon.
#+begin_quote
Rather, we ask how those categories arise, change, and disappear in historical society.
#+end_quote
That's not materialism, that's standard dialectics.
#+begin_quote
That’s a silly misreading of the quote, the main point of which is this: “But, as in every department of thought, at a certain stage of development the laws, which were abstracted from the real world, become divorced from the real world, and are set up against it as something independent, as laws coming from outside, to which the world has to conform.”
#+end_quote
Again, my main objection against that quote was that it was creating an opposition between "real" things and mathematical entities, which, if mathematicism is true, is wrong.
#+begin_quote
You imply that Engels failed to understand Hegel, but Marx knew better,
#+end_quote
I did no such thing! In fact, at the beginning of the piece I said that Marx made a grievous error in throwing out the best parts of Hegel, though he did at least give us a good theory of social reproduction.
#+begin_quote
Imagine the arrogance to call Engels a crude thinker just because you know a little bit of math!
#+end_quote
That's not an argument.
My response to this https://open.substack.com/pub/nicolasdvillarreal/p/why-the-universe-is-not-math?utm_source=share&utm_medium=android&r=dygh4
Would you write an article on what Colin Drumm gets wrong?
I didn't say he was wrong, I said he misses the point by focusing on slight imperfections and simplifications. He might be completely right in Marx assuming that money has no cost for instance, but removing that simplifying assumption does not change the derivation of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, which is what really matters. Moreover, even if it was found that a simplification was made by Marx whose removal would invalidate his derivation of TRPF, it would then have to be shown that this was not just a slight error in the proof that could be corrected for easily, which, I think, couldn't be done because I think it's not particularly hard to derive TRPF because it's a fairly elementary consequence of the way we derive value. In fact, I think Marx's derivation might have been overly complicated, which isn't to say anything against him, scientists often derive new results from an overly elaborate set of assumptions that can be trimmed down later, and Marx was trying to fortify his position against as many objections as he could. I don't feel familiar enough with Drumm's work for an in-depth treatment though.